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PERKINS, SCHWOBE & McLACHLAN
Richard W. Perkins (2567)
Attorney for Appellant
343 South 4th East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-6808
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DEBRA S. RETHERFORD,
Appellant,
vs.

:
:
:

AT&T COMMUNICATIONS OF THE
MOUNTAIN STATES, INC.;
CATHY BATESON; LOUISE
JOHNSON; VICKIE RANDALL;
DOE I THROUGH DOE X,
Respondents.

:

DOCKETING STATEMENT
(Subject to Assignment
to the Court of Appeals)

:
:

Case No.

890464

:

Appellant Debra S. Retherford, pursuant to Rule 9 of the
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, submits the following Docketing
Statement in the above-entitled matter.
1.

The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this

Appeal pursuant to the provisions of 78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended), and Rule 3 of the Rules of the Utah
Supreme Court.
2.

This is an Appeal from a final Order entered in the

Third Judicial District Court in Civil No. 890902183CV, on
October 10, 1989.

3. The Order sought to be reviewed was entered on the 10th
day of October, 1989, and the Notice of Appeal was filed on
October 25, 1989.
4.

A true and correct copy of the Order from which this

Appeal is taken is attached hereto as Exhibit "A".

A true and

correct copy of the Notice of Appeal is attached hereto as Exhibit
"B M .
STATEMENT OF FACTS
5.

Appellant was initially employed as a telephone

operator by Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company in
Grant Junction, Colorado, during April, 1976.
6.

During February, 1983, pursuant to the nationwide

divestiture of AT&T, Appellant transferred to the "Wasatch
Office" of AT&T, located in Salt Lake City, Utah, where Appellant
continued her employment with AT&T as a telephone operator.
7.

Subsequent to Appellant's transfer to the Wasatch

Office, Appellant became aware that sexually-offensive comments,
jokes and physical contact were common-place at the Wasatch
Office.
8.

Shortly after Appellant's transfer to the Wasatch

Office, Appellant was contacted by her Manager Fayonne Johanneson
for the purpose of discussing the employees' Code of Conduct which
had been published by AT&T.

During such conversation, Appellant

was required to sign an entry in her work records indicating that
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she had discussed and understood the contents of the Code of
Conduct.

Such procedure was repeated on a yearly basis, with

Appellant discussing said Code of Conduct with whoever was her
manager at the time.

While certain minor revisions to the Code of

Conduct were made from year to year, upon information and belief,
the provisions concerning sexual harassment and retaliation, and
designating the EEO Coordinator's Office as an appropriate grievance procedure, remained the same throughout Appellant's employment with AT&T.

Upon further information and belief, all

telephone operators of AT&T were required to review and endorse
the Code of Conduct on a yearly basis as a condition of their
continued employment with AT&T.
9.

During approximately April, 1983, Appellant overheard

a male employee of the Wasatch Office state to another male
employee words to the effect of, "I'm bisexual, what are you?"
10.

During approximately July, 1983, Respondent Johnson

was overheard by Appellant and, upon information and belief, by
several other employees of the Wasatch Office, loudly describing
in explicit detail, a sexual encounter that she had allegedly had
with a male employee of the Wasatch Office.
11.

Commencing approximately June of 1983, Appellant began

to be subjected to unwanted and offensive advances from Jolene
Gailey (hereinafter referred to as Gailey), who was at all times
material hereto an employee of Defendant AT&T at the Wasatch
Office, which included comments by Gailey concerning Appellant's
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physical appearance, suggestions that Appellant join Gailey in
various activities, and physical touching.
12.

At approximately the same time as the commencement

of Gailey 1 s conduct toward Appellant referred to in the preceding
paragraph, certain other employees of the Wasatch Office, including Respondent Johnson, who were, upon information and belief,
personal firends of Gailey, began to congregate around Appellant
with regularity.

Such employees frequently and regularly con-

versed explicitly upon subjects of a sexual and/or homosexual
nature.
13.

On or about November 22, 1984, Gailey, who was visibly

intoxicated at the time, sat next to Appellant at work and stated
words to the effect of "I'm going to save you from Dave Todd."
On this occasion, Gailey placed her hand upon Appellant's arm
in an affectionate manner, which greatly offended Appellant.
14.

Subsequent to November 22, 1983, the aforementioned

pattern of conduct perpetrated upon Appellant by Gailey became
more aggressive, to the point where, during approximately December
of 1984, Gailey asked Appellant to pose nude while Gailey prepared
a picture or sculpture.
15.

Shortly following the incident referred to in the pre-

ceding paragraph, Gailey, on a separate occasion, told Appellant
that she (Gailey) needed to find a roommate, and that she hated
men and even the sound of men's voices on the telephone.
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When

Appellant did not respond to these statements by Gailey, Gailey
grabbed Appellants arm and said words to the effect of, "Debi,
why don't you talk to me?"
16.

During approximately December, 1983, Appellant was

telephoned at her residence by Gailey.

Upon information and

belief, said telephone call was made by Gailey from the Wasatch
Office during her working hours.
17.

During approximately January, 1984, a male employee of

the Wasatch Office passed a note to Appellant, which note stated
that Appellant was having an affair with a certain other male
employee.

Upon information and belief, Gailey was the originator

of the allegation contained within said note.
18.

During approximately March, 1984, Gailey telephoned

Appellant at Appellant's residence and asked Appellant if she
intended to file an EEOC Complaint against Gailey.

Such inquiry

was made by Gailey, upon information and belief, pursuant to
instructions of Respondent Bateson-Hough.

Appellant responded

to this inquiry of Gailey by stating that Appellant would file an
EEOC Complaint if Gailey continued to bother Appellant.

Appellant

further informed Gailey during this conversation that Appellant
had been offended by Gailey*s asking Appellant to pose nude.
Gailey stated in response to Appellant's comments words to the
effect of, "I'm sorry if I offended yo, but I feel I shouldn't
apologize for my sexuality."
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19.

Subsequent to the telephone conversation referred to

in the preceding paragraph, Gailey and certain other employees
of the Wasatch Office, including the individuals named herein as
Respondents, commenced upon a regular practice of retaliatory
harassment of Appellant, which included, inter alia, staring at,
and making threatening facial expressions at Appellant, walking
extremely close to Appellant, following Appellant, and talking
about Appellant amongst themselves.

On one occasion during

approximately March, 1984, Appellant became so upset by this
conduct that she was required to leave work early.
20.

During approximately March, 1984, Appellant, on two

separate occasions, complained verbally to Supervisor Hilda
Shelley, and Manager Al Reynolds, concerning the pattern of
harassment referred to in the preceding paragraph.
21.

On or about May 8, 1984, Gailey assumed a position

immediately next to Appellant on the stand-up computer boards
at a time when many other positions were available.
immediately moved to another position.

Appellant

Within approximately 10

minutes thereafter, Gailey moved to a different position.
22.

On or about May 9, 1984, Appellant wrote and delivered

to Bateson-Hough a letter stating that Gailey had continued harass
ing Appellant in spite of Appellant's requests to Gailey that she
not do so.
23.

On or about May 10, 1984, appellant submitted a

written complaint to the office of the EEO Coordinator for AT&T.
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24.

On or about May 15, 1984, Appellant received a tele-

phone call at her residence from Richard Salazar, who was at that
time, upon information and belief, an employee of AT&T and a Union
Steward of CWA.

During the ensuing telephone conversation,

Salazar stated to Appellant words to the effect of,
new kid on the block —

you're not going to win this.

"You're the
We don't

know you very well, but we do know Jolene, she is a respectable
person in the community and an artist" and "Somebody could get
fired over this."
25.

On or about May 31, 1984, at approximately 1:15 a.m.,

Gailey drove her vehicle at a high rate of speed past Appellant
while Appellant was attempting to cross the street to her vehicle.
Gailey then proceeded to follow Appellant south on 1-15 to the
13th South exit.
26.

During June, 1984, the EEO Coordinator's Office for

AT&T, per Linda Johnston, who was at that time, upon information
and belief, a personal friend of Bateson-Hough, conducted an invest
tigation into Appellant's written complaint filed on or about
May 10, 1984.

Said investigation, upon information and belief,

consisted wholly of personal interviews of Appellant and Gailey,
and the submission of written statements by Appellant and Gailey.
27.

During approximately June, 1984, Appellant partici-

pated in a conversation with Darlene Anderson, who was at that
time, upon information and belief, a first-level manager at the
Wasatch Office.

Said conversation included a discussion of
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Appellant's problems with Gailey, in regard to which Anderson
stated to Appellant words to the effect of, "Just be careful what
you say and do; this is a strong and big group that you are dealing with."
28.

On or about July 10, 1984, the EEO Coordinator's

Office for AT&T, per Linda Johnston, submitted its report and
recommendation in regard to Appellant's written complaint of
May 10, 1984.

Said report recommended Appellant and Gailey have

as little contact with each other as possible in the future.
29.

During approximately July, 1984, following the issu-

ance of the report by the EEO Coordinator for AT&T, Appellant
received a telephone call from Reta Pehrson, who was, upon
information and belief, at that time a supervisor for AT&T and
Vice President of Telephone Operators for CWA.

During this

conversation, Pehrson stated to Plaintiff words to the effect
of "You have to be satisfied with the EEO's decision" and "If
anybody asks you about it, don't tell them and don't say anything."

Pehrson also stated words to the effect of, "Cathy

wanted me to also tell you that if you would like a transfer,
she will transfer you to the Sundance Office."
30.

During approximately July, 1984, Appellant overheard

an employee of the Wasatch Office, who was at that time engaged
in a conversation with two other employees, including Respondent
Johnson, state words to the effect of, "Debi would make a good
stripper —

she has big boobs."

Immediately following said
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statement, Respondent Johnson stated, while looking directly at
Appellant, words to the effect of, "My bra size is 34B."
31.

Subsequent to the issuance of the EEO Coordinator's

report on or about July 10, 1984, Gailey and certain other
employees of the Wasatch office, continued to stare at and make
hostile facial expressions toward Appellant, to follow Appellant,
to walk and sit close to Appellant, and to talk about Appellant
amongst themselves.

On one occasion during approximately August,

1984, an employee of the Wasatch Office, stated to Appellant words
to the effect of, "Debi, they're all staring at you."
32.

On or about August 9, 1984, Appellant witnessed a

female employee of the Wasatch Office grab Respondent Johnson's
crotch from behind.

Upon information and belief, Johnson was

employed as a supervisor at the Wasatch Office at the time of
this incident.
33.

On or about August 30, 1984, Appellant filed a charge

letter with the EEOC, alleging, in summary, that Appellant had
been harassed by some of her co-workers during the preceding year,
and that AT&T Management had done nothing to remedy that problem,
despite frequent complaints by Appellant.
34.

During approximately November, 1984, Appellant

received a telephone call at her residence from Alfred A. Aros,
who was at that time, upon information and belief, an investigator
for the EEOC.

During the ensuing telephone conversation, Aros

stated to Appellant that three of the four witnesses whom Aros

- 9 -

had interviewed concerning Appellant's allegations of harassment,
had indicated that there was a "lesbian problem" at the Wasatch
Office.

Aros further advised Appellant that he intended to issue

a warning to AT&T Management concerning said "lesbian problem".
35.

During approximately November of 1984, the Office

of the EEO Coordinator for AT&T administered a survey to the
employees of the Wasatch Office.

On the same day, the Coordin-

ator's Office provided a lecture and film concerning sexual
harassment in the work place to the employees of the Wasatch
Office.
36.

On or about December 29, 1984, Gailey and Respon-

dent Johnson, together with one other employee of the Wasatch
Office, engaged in a conversation within hearing of Appellant.
During said conversation, Appellant and Gailey made eye contact,
whereupon Gailey stated to Appellant words to the effect of "What
are you staring at?

Will you stop staring at me."

Gailey then

stated to Johnson words to the effect of, "She keeps staring at
me."

Johnson then looked directly at Appellant and stated words

to the effect of, "She must think we look like dead dogs."
Upon information and belief, later that same evening, Gailey
stated to Manager Susan Stedman, words to the effect of, "Debi
will be upset about what I said."
37.

On or about December 30, 1984, Appellant wrote and

delivered to Respondent Bateson-Hough a written complaint, in
which Appellant set forth the incident described in the preceding
paragraph.
_

i

A

_

38.

During January, 1985, Bateson-Hough called Appellant

into her office and informed Appellant that Bateson-Hough had
forwarded Appellant's written complaint of December 30, 1984, to
the EEO Coordinator's Office, and had received from the EEO Coordinator's Office in response thereto, a letter which allegedly
reprimanded Appellant for her repeated complaints concerning
Gailey.

Bateson-Hough then stated to Appellant that Appellant

was on warning of dismissal as of that date, said warning to
become part of Appellant's permanent employment record, and that
if Appellant continued to complain about Gailey, Appellant would
be terminated.

Bateson-Hough refused to allow Appellant to review

the alleged letter from the EEO Coordinator's Office, or to allow
Appellant to review her personnel record.
39.

On the same day and immediately prior to Appellant's

having been placed on warning of dismissal by Bateson-Hough
during January of 1985, as referred to within the preceding paragraph, Appellant observed Bateson-Hough and Gailey conversing in
a casual manner.

Upon noticing Appellant, Gailey made a smug

facial expression towards Appellant.
40.

Following Appellant's conversation with Bateson-Hough,

described in the preceding paragraph, Respondents and other
employees of the Wasatch Office, continued to harass and intimidate Appellant by staring at and making hostile facial expressions
toward Appellant, by sitting and walking near Appellant, and by
talking about Appellant amongst themselves.
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41.

On February 22, 1985, Appellant filed a civil action

in the United States District Court for the State of Utah, Central
Division, Civil No.

85-189W, which alleged violations of Title

VII and 42 USC Sec. 1983.

On June 11, 1985, said Complaint was

dismissed by Order of the Court, per Honorable David K. Winder,
due to Appellant's failure to respond to AT&T's Motion to Dismiss
filed April 9, 1985.
42.

During approximately March, 1985, meetings were held

by various managers of the Wasatch Office with each of the
employees of the Wasatch Office, in groups of two or three
employees at a time, for the purpose of discussing the results
of the survey which had been taken by the EEO Coordinator's Office
during approximately November, 1984.

During Appellant's meeting

with Manager Fayone Johannason, Appellant was informed by Johannason that the survey had concluded that there was a great deal of
discussion about sexual matters, including a prevalence of obscene
jokes and remarks at the Wasatch Office.

Johannason also indica-

ted on this occasion that employees of the Wasatch Office should
bring such incidents to the attention of management, rather than
allowing such incidents to remain unreported.
43.

Following the issuance of the EEO Coordinator's report

on the results of the survey which was administered during November of 1984, incidents of obscene jokes and explicit sexual
conversations increased in frequency and offensiveness.
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44.

During approximately March, 1985, Appellant overheard

a conversation wherein Respondent Johnson was speaking loudly with
another female employee.

During said conversation, Johnson stated

to the other employee words to the effect of, "I'm really horny,
I'm going to go finger myself."

In response to this comment by

Johnson, the other employee stated words to the effect of, "If
you need any help, I'll be right next door."
45.

During approximately March of 1985, Appellant, while

working at her station, overheard several employees of the Wasatch
Office, including Johnson, discussing in detail their past alleged
sexual experiences, including homosexual experiences, and including detailed descriptions of sexual organs and various sexual acti
vities.

Said discussion transpired over a period of approximately

30 minutes.
46.

During approximately April, 1985, Appellant, acting in

her capacity as Union Steward, received several complaints from
employees of the Wasatch Office, to the effect that they had seen
Respondent Johnson put her hand down the blouse of another female
employee during work hours.
47.

During approximately May, 1985, Bateson-Hough insti-

tuted a policy whereby some computers would be used solely for
handling slow calls, while other computers would handle only fast
calls.

Operators handling the slow computers would inevitably

have a lower productivity than other operators.
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According to

Bateson-Hough's expressed policy, each operator should have spent
equal time on the slow computers.

However, upon information and

belief, Appellant was required to spend far more than an equal
share of time on the slow computers, with a consequent drop in
productivity.
48.

On or about June 16, 1985, Appellant witnessed Respon-

dent Randall approach Respondent Johnson from behind, put her arms
around Johnson, and kiss Johnson for a period of approximately 60
seconds.

Upon information and belief, Johnson was acting as

supervisor of the Wasatch Office at the time of this incident.
Later that same evening, Appellant overheard an employee of the
Wasatch Office ask Johnson if she (i.e., the other employee)
could eat a brownie while she was working on the computer board.
(Upon information and belief, eating or drinking while working was
contrary to AT&T policy).

In response to said request, Johnson

stated words to the effect of, "No, because there are some people
who will tell on me.

Isn't that right, Debi?"

This statement was

made while Johnson was looking directly at Appellant.

Appellant

suffered great emotional distress as a result of this incident and
was required to leave work early.
49.

During approximately July, 1985, Appellant began to

make regular visits to Jerry S. Gardner, a psychoanalyst, for the
purpose of obtaining treatment for stress and anxiety which
Appellant was suffering as a result of the retaliation and harassment to which Appellant was subjected at the Wasatch Office.
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50.

On or about August 5, 1985, an employee of the Wasatch

Office brought a book to work entitled "Joy of Sex".

Said book

was disseminated and discussed among various employees of the
Wasatch Office, including Respondent Johnson, for a period of
approximately one week.
51.

On or about August 8, 1985, Bateson-Hough, acting as

Manager of the Wasatch Office, altered the seating arrangements of
Wasatch Office employees, with the result that Appellant would
have to sit next to persons who were participating in the retaliatory harassment of Appellant.
52.

On or about August 15, 1985, Appellant witnessed two

female employees of the Wasatch Office lightly rubbing each
other's arms while at work for a period of approximately several
minutes.
53.

During approximately August, 1985, Appellant obtained

a prescription from her physician, Nelson E. Wright, M.D., for
Mellaril, for treatment of stress and anxiety that Appellant was
experiencing as a result of the harassment to which she had been
subjected at the Wasatch Office.
54.

On or about August 22, 1985, Gailey moved to a posi-

tion directly in front of Appellant and stated to appellant words
to the effect of, "What are you looking for?"
55.

On or about August 24, 1985, Respondents Johnson and

Randall moved to positions directly in front of Appellant.

While

working at such positions, Randall put her arm around Johnson and
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stated to Johnson words to the effect of, "It's too bad we're
being watched all the time."
56.

On or about September 7, 1985, Appellant took leave

from work for medical disability, which disability consisted of
severe psychological stress and anxiety resulting from Appellant's
problems at the Wasatch Office.

Said medical disability extended

from September 7, 1985, to the date of Appellant's termination
from AT&T on March 26, 1986.
57.

During November of 1985, Appellant was advised by her

psychiatrist that Appellant would be permanently unable to return
to work at the Wasatch Office.
58.

On or about March 12, 1986, Appellant received a tele-

phone call from Douglas Erickson, who was then Group Manager of
the Wasatch Office.

Respondent Randall was also on the line

throughout the ensuing conversation.

Erickson informed Appellant

during this conversation that inasmuch as Appellant would be
medically incapable of continuing her employment at the Wasatch
Office, Appellant would be required to transfer for work to Boise,
Idaho, such transfer to be effective within ten (10) days from the
date thereof, in order for Appellant to retain her employment with
AT&T.

During this conversation, Appellant responded to Erickson's

statement by informing Erickson that it would be impossible for
Appellant to transfer upon such short notice inasmuch as Appellant
was then undergoing psychiatric treatment in Salt Lake City for
the injuries which she had sustained through AT&T's harassment
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against Appellant and inasmuch as Appellant's minor daughter was
attending school in Salt Lake City, Utah•

In response to these

statements by Appellant, Randall stated words to the effect of,
"What do you expect us to do, build you a new building?"

Erick-

son responded to Appellant's statements by informing Appellant
that Appellant's failure to report for work in Boise, Idaho,
within ten days would result in Appellant's termination from AT&T.
59.

On or about March 28, 1986, Appellant received a

letter from Erickson dated March 26, 1986.

In said letter,

Erickson informed Appellant that inasmuch as Appellant had
failed to report for work in Boise, Idaho, by March 23, 1986,
appellant's employment with AT&T was terminated, effective
March 26, 1986.
60.

On April 5, 1989, Appellant commenced the present

action by filing a civil Complaint in the Third Judicial District
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Civil No. 890902183CV.
Said Complaint alleged numerous claims under state law arising
from Respondents' retaliatory harassment and discharge of Appellant. Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on June 1, 1989.

On

October 10, 1989, the District Court, per the Honorable J. Dennis
Frederick, entered its Order on Respondents' Motion to Dismiss,
treating said Motion as a Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissing Appellant's Verified Complaint on all counts.
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

ARE APPELLANT'S CLAIMS PRE-EMPTED BY THE EXCLUSIVE
REMEDY PROVISION OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SEC. 34-357.1(11) (1953, AS AMENDED)?
Respondents argued below that the Utah Anti-

Discrimination Act pre-empts Appellant's common-law claims.
Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 34-35-7.1(11) provides:
The procedures contained in this section and
Section 34-35-8 are the exclusive remedy under
state law for employment discrimination because
of race, color, sex, age, religion, national
origin, or handicap.
Appellant submits that this provision specifically
omits any reference to retaliation, thereby indicating that commons
law claims arising from retaliatory discharge are not pre-empted.
The Utah Legislature realized the distinction between retaliation
and other forms of discrimination when it enacted the AntiDiscrimination Act, as evidenced by their inclusion of a specific
definition of "retaliate".

Utah Code Annotated, Section 34-35-

2(15).
Further, the Act consistently treats retaliation and
discrimination as distinct concepts.
34-35-6(1)(a)(i), (l)(e), (l)(f)(iii).

Utah Code Annotated, Section
Significantly, Title VII

after which the Anti-Discrimination Act is patterned, specifically
distinguishes between retaliation (42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-3) and
other forms of discrimination (42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2).

Most

importantly, the Utah Legislature has enacted multiple statutory
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prohibitions against employer retaliation. Const. Utah, Art. Ill,
Sec. 19 (Blacklisting); Utah Code Annotated, Sections 67-21-1, et
seq., (Whistleblowers Protection); Utah Code Annotated, Section
34-28-19 (Wage Claims); Utah Code Annotated, Section 34-22-12
(Wage and Hour Disputes).

Hence, the Anti-Discrimination Act was

not intended to be the exclusive remedy for employer retaliation.
II.

ARE APPELLANT'S CLAIMS PRE-EMPTED BY GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION?
Respondents argued below that, independent from the

exclusive remedy provision of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act,
the Act should be construed as pre-empting all common-law claims
arising in the context of employment discrimination pursuant to
general principles of statutory construction.

As the parties

memoranda below indicated, the pre-emptive effect of state
statutory remedies for employment discrimination where the statutory provisions contain no express exclusive remedy clause is a
much-disputed issue in recent employment law.

Compare Makovi v.

The Sherwin-Williams Company, 561 At.2d 179 (MD, 1989) (commonlaw claims pre-empted); and McCool v. Park Royal Convalescent
Center, 777 P.2d 1013 (Ore. App. 1989) (common-law claims not
pre-empted).

Appellant submits that this controversy is largely

inapplicable in the present case because the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act specifically excludes retaliatory discharge from its
exclusive remedy provision.

The distinction made in the Utah

Anti-Discrimination Act between retaliation and other forms of
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discrimination reflects the distinction between discrimination
based upon status and retaliation for the exercise of a legal
right, which has been recognized in other jurisdictions, Makovi,
supra, at 184; Holien v. Sears, Roebuck & Company, 689 P.2d 1292,
(Ore., 1984) (Linde, J. concurring).
Assuming, arguendo, that it is necessary to apply
general principles of statutory construction to determine the
issue of pre-emption in the present case, Appellant submits that
the opinions which have found no pre-emption are better reasoned
and more sensitive to the problem of employment discrimination
and the limited effectiveness of statutory remedies.

For example,

Rojo v. Kliger, 257 Cal.Rptr. 158 (Cal.App. 2 Dist., 1989).
Further, there is no indication in the legislative history of
the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act that the Act was intended as
the exclusive remedy for retaliatory discharge.

To the contrary,

the Legislature has manifest its intent to provide multiple
remedies for retaliation.
III.

IS APPELLANT'S CLAIM FOR WRONGFUL DISCHARGE PREEMPTED BY THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT?
Respondents argued below that Utah should not recognize

a common-law claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy where a collective bargaining agreement provides a contractual remedy to the employee.

This argument has been rejected by

the majority of the courts which have considered it.
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For example,

Peabody Galion v. Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309 (10th Cir., 1981); Lepore
v. Natl. Tool & Mfg. Co., 540 A.2d 1296 (NJ Sup. 1988).

The pri-

mary reason for rejecting Respondents1 argument has been that
state policy is independent and superior to any contractual
arrangement of the parties.

Moreover, it would be anomalous to

provide a greater degree of protection to "at-will" employees
than to employees under contract.

In her majority opinion in

Berube v. Fashion Centre, LTD, 104 UAR 4, 15 Note 10, Justice
Durham implied that a cause of action for wrongful discharge
would lie for both contractual and non-contractual employees.
Further, the statutory prohibitions upon retaliatory discharge
in the state of Utah apply equally to union and non-union
employees.
IV.

For example, Utah Code Annotated Section 34-35-6.
ARE APPELLANT'S CLAIMS PRE-EMPTED BY FEDERAL
LABOR LAW?
Respondents argued below that Appellant's claims are

pre-empted by Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act
(29 USC, Sec. 185), which has been recognized as providing the
exclusive remedy for breach of a collective bargaining agreement.
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 85 L Ed. 2d 206
(1985).

However only state law claims which are "inextricably

intertwined" with an interpretation of a collective bargaining
agreement are pre-empted.

Allis-Chalmers, at 216.

In general,

state law claims for violation of public policy are not preempted, because they derive from rights which are wholly
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independent and distinct from the collective bargaining agreement.I
Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 108 S.Ct. 1877 (1988).
On their face, Appellant's state law claims in this case have
nothing to do with the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
least, an issue of fact is presented.

At the

Lingle, at 1882.

Appellant's Verified Complaint contains a claim for
breach of implied contract.

This claim arises from Respondent

AT&T's "Code of Conduct" which Appellant was required to read and
sign each year as a condition of her continued employment..

The

Code of Conduct contains an express prohibition upon retaliation
and discrimination.

It also sets forth a procedure to remedy such

retaliation or discrimination (AT&T's "EEO Office"), which is
completely distinct from any remedy contained in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement.

Thus, Appellant submits that Respondents

breached their independent contractual duty to Appellant under
the Code of Conduct.

The existence of a Collective Bargaining

Agreement does not preclude the existence of an independent employ!
ment contract for purposes of Sec. 301 pre-emption.

Caterpillar,

Inc., v. Williams, 96 L Ed.2d 318 (1987).
V.

ARE APPELLANT'S CLAIMS FOR NEGLIGENT RETENTION, BREACH
OF IMPLIED CONTRACT, AND INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS BARRED BY LIMITATIONS?
The parties agreed below that the above-mentioned

claims are subject to the four-year Statute of Limitations provided by Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 78-12-25(2).
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Respondents

asserted that because some of their tortious conduct occurred
prior to the limitations period, those claims are barred by limita
tions.

However, it is clear from Appellant's Affidavit that most,

if not all, of Respondents' tortious acts occurred within the
limitations period.
VI.

This issue is at least one of fact.

DID APPELLANT ALLEGE SUFFICIENT FACTS TO STATE A CLAIM
FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS?
Appellant submits that her Verified Complaint and

Affidavit were more than sufficient to create an issue of fact
upon this claim.
VII.

DID APPELLANT STATE A CLAIM AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL
RESPONDENTS FOR MALICIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT?
Respondents raised two arguments below with respect to

Appellant's claims for tortious interference:

(1)

With reference

to Respondent Bateson-Hough, Respondents argued that as a management employee, Bateson-Hough was a party to any employment contract between Appellant and AT&T, and, therefore, could not
interfere with the contract.

(2)

With reference to Respondents

Johnson and Randall, Respondents argued that Appellant failed to
state a claim because she did not allege that these Respondents
"persuaded" or "conspired" with another to breach the contract
which existed between Appellant and AT&T.
Appellant submits that a management employee can be
guilty of tortious interference where he or she acts out of purely
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personal motives, such as malice.

Zappa v. Seiver, 706 P.2d 440,

(CA App. 1985); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital, 710
P2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985).

The existence of malice is an issue of

fact.
With respect to the non-management employees, Appellant
submits that her Verified Complaint and Affidavit are sufficient
to create an issue of fact as to whether these Respondents conspired with or persuaded another to breach their contract with
Appellant.
REASONS FOR SUPREME COURT REVIEW
This Appeal should be decided by the Utah Supreme Court
for the following reasons:
1.

No determinative Utah law exists concerning the scope

of the public policy exception to at-will employment.
2.

No determinative Utah law exists concerning the

applicability of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act's exclusive
remedy provision to cases involving retaliatory discharge.
3.

No determinative Utah law exists concerning a manage-

ment employee's liability for malicious interference with
contract.
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AUTHORITIES
The following authorities are believed by Appellant to
be determinative of certain issues raised in this Appeal:
Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 34-35-1, et. seq.
Berube v. Fashion Center LTD., 104 UAR 4 (1989);
Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc.,
108 S.Ct. 1877 (1988).
DATED this 30th day of November, 1989.
Respectfully submitted,
PERKINS, SCHWOBE & McLACHLAN

Richard W. Perkins
Attorney for Appellant
343 South 4th East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

I hereby certify I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Docketing Statement to Richard M. Hymas, Attorney for
Respondents, at Suite 1100, Eagle Gate Plaza, 60 East South
Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah

84147, postage prepaid, this 30th

day of November, 1989.

lywXa^,/ W' \t^JL^^—
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Richard M. Hymas, USB No. 1612
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Attorneys for Defendants
Suite 1100
Eagle Gate Plaza & Office Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DEBRA S. RETHERFORD,
ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 890902183CV
AT&T COMMUNICATIONS OF THE
MOUNTAIN STATES, INC.;
CATHY BATESON; JOLENE GAILEY;
LOUISE JOHNSON; VICKIE RANDALL;
DOE I THROUGH DOE X,

Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss having come before the Court
for decision, and the Court having reviewed the memoranda and
affidavits submitted by Plaintiff and Defendants, and the Court
having determined that Defendants1 Mqtion to Dismiss should be
treated as a motion for summary judgment; and the Court having
found that there are no genuine issues of material fact; and the
Court having further determined that Defendants are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law; now, therefore,

EXHIBIT "A1

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants* Motion to Dismiss,
being

treated

as a motion

for

summary

judgment,

which is
is hereby

granted.

DATED this

10

day of

Q^h^^_

' 1989.

BY THE COURT:

4-

Honorable J. Dennis Frederick
District Judge
Honor<

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify

that on this

day of September, 1989, I

served upon Plaintiff a true and correct copy of the foregoing
ORDER, by mailing the same, postage prepaid, to the following:
Richard W. Perkins, Esq.
RICHARDS, SCHWOBE & McLACHLAN
343 South 400 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

OL4

1822.AT827.JBS
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PERKINS, SCHWOBE & McLACHLAN
Richard W. Perkins (2567)
Attorney for Plaintiff
343 South 4th East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-6808
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE

OF

UTAH

^

y

DEBRA S. RETHERFORD,
Plaintiff,
NOTICE OF APPEAL
vs.
AT&T COMMUNICATIONS OF
THE MOUNTAIN STATES, INC.;
CATHY BATESON; LOUISE JOHNSON;
VICKIE RANDALL; DOE I
THROUGH DOE X,

Civil No. 890902183CV
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants.
* * * * * * * * *

COMES NOW the Plaintiff Debra S. Retherford, by and through
her attorney of record, Richard W. Perkins, and hereby appeals to
the Utah State Supreme Court the Order which was entered upon
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss by the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on October 10,
1989.
PERKINS, SCHWOBE & McLACHLAN

lAJ,\f^*JU*h~

DATED: October 25, 1989

Richard W. Perkins
Attorney for Plaintiff
343 South 4th East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
!
«o»
<=XH!BIT "B

j

I hereby certify I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Notice of appeal to Richard M. Hymas, Attorney for
Defendants, at Post Office Box 11808, Salt Lake City, Utah
postage prepaid, this

<^-5 day of October, 1989.
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